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This report analyses the venture capital industry and the role venture capitalists play
in initial public offerings (IPO). Venture capitalists invest in the private equity market.
They provide financial support and professional expertise in exchange for equity of their
portfolio companies. These companies have attractive growth potential, but lack access to
typical sources of external financing such as public securities markets or credit markets.
With its history tracing back to the Middle Ages, the venture capital industry has
expanded most rapidly during the post World War n Era. Prior to this time, wealthy
individuals were the main source of investment capital; however, the industry is now
characterized by more institutional investors such as pension funds.
The industry is organized by four different types of venture capital firms: corporate
industrial groups, independent private capital firms, venture capital subsidiaries of fmancial
corporations, and small business investment companies (SBIC). Typical sources of venture
capital are pension funds, insurance companies, endowments, and corporate and foreign
investors. There are specific geographic concentrations for capital commitments and
disbursements.
Venture capitalists, focusing on high growth industries, typically hold their investment
for five to ten years. During this time, they often provide multiple rounds of fmancing to
their portfolio company and actively monitor its business operations. As the portfolio
company progresses through the various stages of the business development process, the risk
level of the investment decreases. Since industry returns vary from period to period, experts
believe the venture capital industry is cyclical.
The second objective of this report is to determine the role of the venture capitalist in
the IPO process. An IPO is the first issuance of public securities by a company. Typically,
the IPO results in large positive returns in the first day of public trading. Many underpricing
theories are examined in this report to explain the large initial returns.
The IPO is a very popular exit strategy for venture capitalists. It allows them to
liquidate their equity holding and realize a return on investment. In order to understand the

relationship between the venture capital industry and the IPO process, I recorded the stock
characteristics and tracked the perfonnance of almost every venture-backed IPO of 1992. I
collected 20 days of closing prices for 147 individual securities and the market index. With
this data, I calculated the daily returns and used regression analysis to explain the role
venture capitalists play in the IPO process.
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.
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VENTURE CAPITAL DEFINED

The venture capital industry covers a wide range of investments in the private equity market. Venture
i

capitalists provide seed, startup, and expansion financing to businesses demonstrating viability, but lacking
access to the public securities market or to the credit-oriented institutional funding sources. These financial
intermediaries provide risk capital to companies that offer high potential returns (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and
Vetsuypens, p. 449.)
However, in their role as financial intermediaries, venture capitalists provide more than just capital.
Venture capitalists also contribute their business expertise and actively monitor an entrepreneurial firm's
development as an information intermediary.

With an investment horizon averaging at least five to ten years, in

order to achieve significant returns, venture capitalists try to add value to the developing firm (Morris, p. 7).
This is achieved by participating directly in management, using their industry contacts to recruit key employees,
assisting in production, and developing customer relations (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 450).
Like leveraged buyout (LBO) specialists, venture capitalists also actively improve performance of companies.
However, LBO specialists invest in mature companies with historical and predictable cashflows (Barry,
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 448). Venture capitalists are unique, therefore, by serving as the
critical bridge between entrepreneurs

and the capital markets.

mSTORY OF VENTURE CAPITAL

Techniques

for financing high-risk

illiquid ventures have existed ever since the Middle Ages when

merchants, nobles, and clergy recycled their wealth by underwriting voyages and commercial ventures (Wilson,
p. 13). Queen Isabella served the role of a venture capitalist when she backed Christopher Columbus.
With the Industrial Revolution, however, entrepreneurs had to rely more on their own capital or seek
financing from suppliers or customers (Wilson, p. 14). Informal venture capital provided by friends, relatives,
and local merchants was the most common source of financing for American entrepreneurs in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. During the pre-World War II era, the venture capital investors were limited to wealthy
individuals such as Laurance Rockefeller, John Hay Whitney, and Georges Doriot (Wilson, p. 13). These men
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fulfilled an urgent need by providing financial services that capitalize on the opportunities from the explosive
changes in science and technology. By finding, evaluating, and funding promising ideas, these American
venture capitalists developed successful companies such as Eastern Airlines, Minute Maid, and American
Research and Development Corporation (Wilson, pp. 15, 18, & 19).
However, World War II changed the American economic, social, and business environment.

The

creation of the formal venture capital industry was sparked by many post-World War II conditions. The rapid
economic expansion encouraged new products based on new technologies and discoveries.

This provided many

avenues for venture capital funding. The increasing dominance of large corporations created a more institutionalized and hierarchical

work environment.

This required private companies

to have adequate capital and skilled

dedicated management to successfully compete against these large firms. Finally, faced with growing demand
for their loan money, banks and other financial intermediaries were unwilling to provide adequate fmancial
support for unproven, risky investments in private ventures.
The Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958 created small business investment companies
(SBICs) as vehicles to provide capital for small businesses. SBICs offered tax advantages and were the first
product of the organized venture capital industry. By 1960, over 585 SBICs were licensed (Morris, p. 7). The
industry's

growth and performance,

however,

declined due to inadequate

private capitalization,

excessive

government regulation, and lack of management experience (Morris, p. 7).
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, new private venture emerged. Unlike the SBICs that received
government financing, funding for the private venture capital firms came from institutional investors such as
insurance companies, pension funds, and bank trust departments (Morris, p. 8). These new venture firms
invested heavily in early-stage financing for young businesses. With failures becoming evident early, and
successful firms stung by the recession of 1974 and 1975, the institutional investors began to question the
venture capitalists' investment strategies. However, the maturing venture partnerships started to reap the
rewards from their value-added management and long-term investment horizon to earn approximately 25 percent
compounded annual return (Morris, p. 8).
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The adverse economic pressures experienced in the mid 1970s, however, did have an impact on the
venture capital industry. Venture capitalists were forced to widen their investment interest and to encourage
greater industry cooperation. Investment dollars were also targeted to later-stage expansion financing that would
have formerly received capital from public market underwritings (Morris, p. 8). By 1979, less than $200
million was committed to venture capital funds (National Venture Capital Association Annual Report, p. 4).
The venture capital industry experienced rapid growth during the 1980s. The stock market was
receptive to emerging

growth businesses

and venture-backed

companies

on the public market encouraged

more

activity in this dynamic industry. Venture capitalists raised $4.5 billion in 1983 compared to only $1.8 billion
raised one year earlier (Morris, p. 9). The growth was fueled by the reduction of the capital gains tax and
increased pension fund investments in venture capital partnerships (Morris, p. 9). With more institutional
investors and fewer high-net-worth individuals, the rules of the venture capital game changed. In contrast to the
previous buy-and-hold investment mentality, the institutional investors brought concepts of asset allocation,
quarterly valuations, liquidity, and faster return on investments (Bavaria, p. 18). These investors gravitated
toward later-stage financing because they were less labor intensive, involved larger, more well-known
companies, and provided faster paybacks.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE VENTURE CAPITAL INDUSTRY

The trend for venture capitalists to invest in larger funds is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Big institutional
investors, such as pension funds, invest large amounts of money. The only way, however, to invest it all
without owning the company is to invest in funds that are themselves very large (Bavaria, p. 18).
The venture capital community experienced growth from $12.1 billion under management ten years ago
to over $30 billion at the end of 1991. See Figure 1. The number of venture capital firms have declined from
a high of 670 in 1989 to 640 in 1991 (National Venture Capital Association Annual Report, p. 14). This has
created a positive environment for the remaining funds. With reduced competition, the venture capitalists are
investing in companies with more conservative risk valuations. The current trend in the venture capital industry
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is to provide later-stage

financing

percent of all disbursements

to medical- and software-related

businesses.

in 1990 and 35 percent in 1991 (National

These segments received 33

Venture Capital Association

Annual

Report, p. 35).

FIGURE I

TOTAL VENTURE CAPITAL UNDER MANAGEMENT
$ Billions
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Source:
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5
TYPES OF VENTURE CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are four primary types of venture capital organizations.

The source of funds, type of venture

capital financing, and motives for venture capital investments vary among each of these organizations.
Independent private venture capital firms are the principal institutional source of venture capital for large
corporations.

Corporate industrial groups also contribute for strategic as well as investment opportunities.

Extending their lending and investment analysis techniques, financial corporations provide venture capital
through subsidiaries.

Finally,

many SBICs are lending companies

that represent

the only institutional

source of

long-term capital for small businesses (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," pp. 69-70). Figure
2 shows the venture capital under management for the four types of firms.

FIGURE

2

Venture Capital Under Management

by Type of Finn

$Millions
1986*

1987*

1988*

1989#

1990#

1991#

Independent Private

$18,800

$23,380

$25,725

$27,287

$28,853

$26,590

Corporate Financial

$2,660

$3,108

$2,868

$4,807

$4,596

$3,810

Corporate Industrial

$2,040

$1,890

$2,083

$2,334

$2,499

$2,470

$640

$640

$463

nla

nIa

$24,140

$29,018

$31,139

SBICs

Total Industry

nIa

$34,427

$35,948

$32,870

Source: Venture Economics

Note:
*
#

SBICs which are affiliated with an independent private or corporate group are not counted under the SBIC category,
but instead with their affiliated group.
From 1989 on, SBICs category will not be included and the SBICs private capital and government leverage will be
included in the independent private or corporate group capital.
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The independent private capital firms are usually organized as a limited partnership.

Limited

partnership income is not subject to corporate taxation. The law requires a specific termination date, restricted
transfer of limited partnership units, and prohibits withdrawal from the partnership prior to termination
(Sahlman, p. 490). Tax benefits and legal constraints provide the greatest motivation to set up the private
independent venture capital firm as a limited partnership (Kozmetsky,Gill, and Smilor, p. 14). The venture
capitalists

serve as the general partners and actively manage the partnerships'

investment

portfolios.

Typically,

general partners provide only one percent of the capital raised (Sahlman, p. 490). The investors take a more
passive role as limited partners.

At the end of 1991,497

independent

firms were operating

in the United States

(National Venture Capital Association, p. 14). The independent private venture capital firms invest primarily in
equity, seed, and startup financing, as well as some mature companies and management buyouts (Pratt, "The
Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 68). A management buyout provides the second type of venture
capital organization
becoming

in the corporate

industrial group.

With the benefits of direct venture capital financing

apparent in the late 1960s and 1970s, corporate

managers

saw venture capital investments

as an

opportunity to gain a "window of technology" (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Instead of focusing on long-term
perceived

these investments

value-added

management

and business development,

strictly as a source of technology

corporate

to enhance their current operations.

managers
Industrial

corporate venture investment activity increased by 1987 with 86 groups versus only 30 groups in 1977 (Pratt,
"The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Corporate managers, placing their own firm's primary business activity first at all times, rarely commit
consistent value-added management and capital necessary to develop their venture capital investment into a
thriving new business. Because of this, corporate industrial groups rarely meet the seven to ten year investment
horizon typical for the venture capital industry (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
The Board of Directors and corporate managers often do not have the patience required to develop attractive
returns from their venture capital investment. It is difficult to maintain a generous supply of capital to the
investment when the investment has been operating at a loss and company-wide capital is lean.
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As venture investors, however, corporations can be very helpful to their portfolio companies by
developing new technology and providing distribution channels. They rely on their venture investments to
provide the innovation they lack. The strategic benefits and opportunities that the venture investments provide,
therefore,

motivate corporate

relationship

industrial groups to invest in small businesses.

may also provide diversification.

The strategic partnering

With this motive, the corporation

invests in fields that are

unrelated to the current operations and not influenced by similar external forces.
Aside from acquiring a minority equity investment in the small business, the industrial group may also
set up a side agreement
licensing agreement,

with the new business.

or the formation

This may include a research and development

of a joint venture (Pratt, "The Organized

contract,

a

Venture Capital Community,"

p.69).
Like the independent

venture capital firms, the non-public

subsidiaries

of corporate

industrial groups

may be organized as a limited partnership with the sponsoring company acting as the general partner. The
subsidiary

may also be set up as a royalty partnership

in which the sponsoring

company pays the partnership

royalties in exchange for an exclusive technology license for manufacturing and marketing the innovation. The
equity partnership method entails the formation of a new corporation after the technology is developed
(Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 23). Finally, a joint venture allows both companies to share in the venture's
profits. The sponsoring company may provide manufacturing and distribution expertise while the new company
brings the product innovation and R&D.
The third type of venture capital organization is the venture capital subsidiary of financial corporations.
In the early 1960s, banks viewed venture capital as an extension of their lending and credit-oriented activities.
Without recognizing the need to provide ongoing active management and expertise, the early results were not
favorable. However, in the 1970s, many financial corporations, especially bank holding companies, used SBICs
to set up non-SBIC separated subsidiaries to invest in business development situations (Pratt, "The Organized
Venture Capital Community," p. 69). This provides an opportunity to finance riskier investments that do not
meet the usual investment criteria, or that do not qualify under SBIC regulations. The subsidiary, however, is
limited to five percent of the parent's capital (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
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Regardless
owned corporation,

of whether the subsidiary

is formed as a private independent

or a division of the parent financial corporation,

venture capital subsidiary.

partnership,

a separate wholly-

the parent remains the sole investor in the

Commitments to individual portfolio companies range from $1 million to $5 million,

and are usually targeted in later-stage business developments and LBOs (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital
Community," p. 69). At the end of 1991, 63 corporate financial groups managed $3.8 billion in venture capital
accounts. These numbers, as shown in Figure 2, have declined since 1989 (National Venture Capital
Association Annual Report, p. 14). While some venture capital subsidiaries, like the Bankers Trust of New
York, specialize in LBOs, the majority of subsidiaries have a broad investment spectrum (Pratt, "The Organized
Venture Capital Community," p. 69).
Finally, the last type of venture capital organization is the SBIC. SBICs are government-backed but
privately-owned organizations that were created in 1958 and regulated through the Small Business Administration.

They are the only institutional

source of long-term

capital for small businesses.

SBlCs make long-term

financing available to SBA-defined small businesses at favorable market rates. SBICs receive their initial
capitalization

from private sources and also obtain funds from the government

or government-guaranteed

loans.

With this capital, SBICs make subordinated or unsecured loans, or equity investments in small business that
could not receive financing through banks or the private equity market (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 20).
With regulations limiting the capital investment in any single company, lending SBICs make numerous small
disbursements to portfolio companies. Because SBICs use government loans to acquire investment capital, they
usually avoid straight equity investments for early-stage companies, favoring instead, preferred stock or debt
(Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 70). SBICs operate across a more diverse range of
venture investment interests; therefore, they provide an attractive source of financing more modest, or lower
risk, businesses.
The government-sponsored venture capital investments by SBICs have a medium risk, return, and time
horizon target. By focusing on attracting new businesses, SBICs trade off high returns associated with riskier
companies for increased employment and an expanded tax base.
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CAPIT AL SOURCES OF INDEPENDENT PRIVATE FUNDS

Managing

over 80 percent of all venture capital, the independent

many sources of funds.

The independent

pension funds, major corporations,

private capital firms have tapped

private capital firms are supported

endowments,

insurance companies,

by high net worth individuals,

and foreign investors.

shows, the various sources of venture capital funds each have their own trend for investing.
regulatory

environment,

and financial strength of the sources cause the distribution

As Figure 3
The economy,

commitments

to vary.

FIGURE 3

SOURCES OF 1991 CAPITAL COMMITMENTS
INSTITUTIONAllY-BACKED
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE FUNDS ONLY
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420/0
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VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT FOCUS

Venture capitalists finance businesses with high growth potential. In order to evaluate an
entrepreneur's likely growth and profitability, the venture capitalist assesses the management, the entrepreneur's
commitment level, and the potential market for the product or service. In addition, the venture capitalist must
also look at the growth and attractiveness of the industry. It is not surprising that many growth companies are
concentrated in a handful of high growth industries such as the medical, computer, and technology fields. See
Figure 4.
The National Venture Capital Association Annual Report highlights the industry concentrations for
investment capital. In 1991,50 percent of the capital investments went to three industries: software and
services, telephone and data communications, and computer hardware and systems (p. 2). The medical and
health related companies declined 5 percent from 1990 to receive only 11 percent of the venture capital in 1991.
This capital was used to finance, for instance, Medimmune,
(Venture Capital Journal,

"IPO Aftermarket,"

percent of the investment

capital.

p. 69).

Finally, computer

a company that specializes

Biotechnology

in medical therapeutics

companies were stable, receiving

8

software and services received 25 percent of the total

capital in 1991.

STAGES OF VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING

There are eight stages of venture capital investing.

Multi-stage

financing is used as a built-in system of

checks and balances in which more capital is available after the new company has reached each successive
milestone. It also reduces investment risk and provides more accurate projections.

As the venture capitalist

provides more capital in later financing stages, however, they demand more equity relative to the contributed
capital since the value of the equity is diluted (Merrill and Nichols, p. 83). This reduces the amount of equity
held by the original management team and reduces the leverage, or bargaining power, for future financing
rounds.
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FIGURE 4

CAPITAL DISBURSEMENTS
Computer

Software

Telephn & Data Comm.
$224

& Systems
$302

Biotech
$151
Other Prodts & Svc.
$238

Other Electron ics
$123

Medical/Health
$317

Consumer Related
$189

Care

1990 ($Millions)

Computer

Hdwre & Sys.
$168
Telephn & Data Comm.
$169

Software

I

I

Hdwre & Sys.
$216

All other
$162

I

-

BY INDUSTRY

& Systems
$337
All other
$73
Other Prodts & Svc.
$83

Consumer Related
$135
Other Electronics
$112

Medical/Health
$152

1991 ($ Millions)
Source:

Venture

Economics
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Seed investment

is the earliest type of investment

made in a venture.

The venture capitalist provides a

small amount of capital to an inventor or entrepreneur to determine whether their idea deserves further
consideration.

Investments

rarely exceed $50,000.

The capital is used to prove a concept, build a prototype,

or

fund product development (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 8).
Startup financing goes to companies that are less than one year old. The capital is used for prototype
testing, test marketing, analysis of market penetration potential, and formation of a management team to define
the business plan (Sahlman, p. 479).
First-stage financing provides capital for early development stages of the venture. Assuming that the
prototypes

are attractive,

the technical risk is relatively

low, and the marketing

studies reflect adequate demand,

management will use the capital to set up manufacturing and shipping operations (Sahlman, p. 479). Initial
sales, however, will likely be unprofitable.
Second-stage financing provides expansion capital for equipment purchases, inventory, and receivable
fmancing (Sahlman,

p. 479).

At this stage, the company has received feedback from the market and realizes

that the speed and limits to product growth is influenced by the capital available for sales, marketing, and
production.

In the third stage of venture capital investing, companies undergo rapid expansion that requires more
working capital than can be generated from its internal cash flow. Attractive sales growth and positive profit
margins reduce the investment risk. The company is profitable, but relies on the venture capitalist to fund plant
expansion, marketing, working capital, or product improvement (Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor, p. 9). Some
funds may be supplied by banks if the company can provide adequate collateral from assets or receivables.
For fourth-stage companies, capital may be needed to sustain growth, but the investment risk is low
enough to permit them to obtain credit through commercial banks. This allows management to substitute bank
loans in order to limit equity dilution in the new business. The company, at this stage, is experiencing rapid
growth toward the liquidity point.

II
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The next stage of venture capital investing,

the bridge stage, provides the company

sustain its rapid growth until it can access the public security markets.
market conditions,

such as interest rates, feasibility of acquisitions

IPO market (Sahlman,
Finally,
company.

FIGURE

or leveraged buyouts,

are sensitive to

and the activity in the

the liquidity stage is the time at which the venture capitalist can "cash out" their holdings in a

The exit strategy may utilize an IPO, acquisition,

or LBO.
by financing stage.

capital, or $485 million, went to fund seed or early-stage

the investment

investments

p. 479).

Figure 5 shows the amount of capital disbursements
disbursed

Mezzanine

with capital to

projects.

In 1991, 36 percent of

However,

the majority,

46 %, of

capital was used in later-stage deals and LBOs.
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VENTURE CAPITAL DISBURSEMENTS
BY FINANCING STAGE
$Millions
$5

$4

.

IT]Other

$3

CJ LBO/Aquisition

$2
$1
$0
Other
LBO/Aquisition
Expansion
Other Early
Startup
Seed
Source:

Venture

1987 1988
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$0.089
$0.601
$1.416
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In order to control entrepreneurs,
higher prices as each development
of equity for relatively
development

the venture capitalist provides funds in stages and at progressively

milestone is reached.

smaller, but necessary

(Megginson

Entrepreneurs,

therefore,

cash infusions to overcome

and Mull, p. 3). By substituting

relinquish

substantial

shares

the critical early stages of business

stock ownership

for higher current income, the

entrepreneur accepts the risks of poor performance (Sahlman, p. 510).
Venture capitalists
venture capitalist preference

use convertible
in liquidation

investor to retain a proportional

preferred

stock as an investment

after creditors,

vehicle.

Not only does it give the

but this hybrid security also allows the venture capital

stake in superior performance.

Taking up to 60 percent of a new company's

equity, the venture capitalist achieves a senior financial claim while enhancing

the firm's borrowing

capacity,

since the stock increases the company's equity base (Megginson and Mull, p. 3).
Unlike the venture capitalist who invests in many ventures and may diversify to reduce its risk through
many venture capital projects funded through many syndicates,
portfolio.

With a significant

amount of money and "sweat equity,"

venture invested in the company,
dedication

the entrepreneur

an entrepreneur's

acceptance

typically holds an undiversified

long hours and stressful dedication

to the

of this risk provides strong support of their

and expected success of the venture.
A detailed level of analysis is needed to assess the risk-reward

environment,

management

growth potential for the venture.

Out of 200 to 300 business proposals received annually,

pass an initial screening process.

After assessing which entrepreneur

and most likely to achieve long-term

talent, and

only 25 to 30 may

is most willing to accept the greatest risk

growth, only five deals are funded.

Of these five deals, there's a 20

percent chance of business failure, a 20 percent chance for a healthy small private business, a 40 percent chance
the venture will merge with a major corporation, and a 20 percent chance it will go public (Kozmetsky, Gill,
and Smilor, p. 8).

RETURN ON VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

The attractiveness

of an investment

is measured by the risk adjusted returns.

Venture capital by its

definition is risk capital. The higher the risk, the more likely the firm will incur significant positive or negative

17
returns.

A venture capitalist,

for example,

In order to continue to attract investments
explosive returns to produce attractive
According

may invest in five deals expecting that any three may come up short.
in venture capital funds, the two successful

deals must provide

average returns for the fund.

to John Hancock Venture Capital Management,

to mature in the late 1970s, the average 30 percent compound

as early venture capital partnerships

return for the venture investments

began

clearly

exceeded any other alternative investment vehicle by at least 10 percent (Morris, p. 8). However, in the mid
1980s it fell to only 5 percent.

An influx of many institutional

funds resulted in too many dollars chasing too few deals.
capital industry,

funding to venture capital partnerships

investors with large commitments

With hundreds of institutions

to venture

trying to tap the venture

jumped from less than $1 billion in 1982 to $4.2 billion

in 1987 (Bavaria, p. 17). The average returns for funds started before 1980 was six times higher than the
returns generated from funds in the mid 1980s (Bavaria, p. 17).
Returns on individual

investments

in the venture capital industry vary greatly.

More than one-third

of

the 383 investments made by 13 venture capital firms between 1969 and 1985 resulted in a negative realized
rate of return.

However,

more than one-third

twice its original cost for the investment
The time horizon for investments

(Sahlman,

investments

resulted in returns greater than

p. 483).

is an important variable influencing

holding period for a venture capital investment
investments

of the remaining

is 4.9 years.

returns.

With roughly one-third of the individual

held for more than six years, the evidence supports that longer investment

related with investments

The estimated average

horizons are directly

with payoffs greater than five times the invested capital (Sahlman,

Experts suggest, however,

p. 487).

that the venture capital industry is cyclical with five to seven years of fat

returns with few investors followed by five to seven years of lean returns due to excess demand (Bavaria,
p. 16). With an estimated 3.8 percent loss on venture funds from 1985 to 1990, the cycle is predicted to reach
its valley and rebound with an average annual return of 25 percent over the next five to ten years (Bavaria,

.
I-

I
II

p. 17).
As shown in Figure 6, the riskier early stage investments
the more predictable,

later-stage

deals using mezzanine

financing,

should provide a greater average return than
for instance.

In recent years, however,

this

.
.
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has not been the case.

Recently,

the highest returns have been from later-stage

financing followed by raw

startups (Bavaria, p. 18). According to this evidence, in order to maximize risk-adjusted returns, a venture
capital firm should select existing profitable companies in attractive industries. This helps to explain the trend
toward later-stage

financing.

However,

some venture capitalists favor startups due to the appeal of working

with a fledgling company to turn it into a winner promising

glittering returns to the patient venture capitalist.

GEOGRAPHIC CONSIDERA nONS

The geographic

breakdowns

for venture capital resources,

commitments,

the activity level and growth in the different regions of the United States.
capital activity has been focused in the Northeast and West Coast.

and disbursements,

Historically,

indicate

most of the venture

Venture capital, however,

has been moving

to other areas of the U.S. over the last ten years (Pratt, "The Organized Venture Capital Community," p. 70).
With consistent monitoring and management of the portfolio company, many venture capital firms
invest capital in companies

within a 200 mile radius.

However,

with more cooperative

firms, venture firms can use other groups located near the business opportunity
and direct links with the portfolio
Massachusetts,
1977, Massachusetts,

New York, California,

Illinois, and Connecticut

(National Venture Capital Association

Massachusetts

contributed

Figure 8 shows this trend.

venture capital in 1991 than the year before.

have controlled

approximately

77 percent

to private venture capital partnerships,

however,

$561

Although the

to venture capital, this represented

The West Coast provided

The Mid-Atlantic,

Since

Annual Report, p. 10).

$286 million or 21.4 percent.

Northeast remains the source of 48 percent of total commitments
by 4 percent since 1990.

to provide ongoing involvement

are still the core business centers for venture capital.

As seen in Figure 7, 40 percent of the money committed
million, was raised in California.

among

company.

New York, and California

of the capital under management

relationships

a decline

16 percent more capital to

fell from 11 percent in 1990 to only

1 percent in 1991. All regions, except the West Coast, saw a decline in capital commitments in 1991.

,
I

.
II
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Just as investors
companies

contribute

the majority of the venture capital funds, California and Massachusetts

received 60 percent of the capital disbursements.

This amounts to $816 million of capital flowing

into these two states. The disbursements in 1991 are shown in Figure 9. As with capital contributions, the

I

West was the center for capital disbursements.

II

I

FIGURE 7

II
II

CAPITAL COMMITMENTS BY liMITED PARTNERS
TO INSTITUTIONAllY FUNDED INDEPENDENT VC FUNDS
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FIGURE 8

CAPITAL COMMITMENTS BY LIMITED PARNTERS
TO INDEPENDENT VC FUNDS BY LOCATION
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FIGURE 9

VENTURE CAPITAL DISBURSEMENTS

BY STATE
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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING (IPO)

An initial public offering (IPO) is the first issuance of public stock by a company. It is also referred to
as "going public."

The IPO decision involves weighing the benefits and drawbacks

Going public allows small companies
This provides

of a public company.

to raise money by selling a portion of their business to public investors.

liquidity for the founders and venture capitalists who can now sell and trade the stock in the

secondary

market at its established

fair market value.

expanding

it to include many unique investors.

The company also has diversified

its source of capital by

The small firm will also gain more respect in the business

community as a public company. This may be seen in more liberal terms for loans. Shares traded in the public
market make it easier to make acquisitions of other companies by simply exchanging shares (Perez, p. 142). A
public company can also effectively

offer an incentive program to its workers in which employees

in the company and share in its success.

In this way, compensation

Although going public has many advantages,
some undesirable

consequences.

is tied to the company's

are co-owners

performance.

the decision to be a public firm is also accompanied

The public markets are very sensitive and uncertain.

The founders,

with

therefore,

are at the mercy of the market in valuing the firm. The company's founders lose more controlling power by
having to surrender

more shares of equity in the IPO.

A smaller company with a low stock price per share

must give up more equity in order to raise the same amount of capital as a large company with a higher stock

price. Few companies with less than $5 million in annual sales go public successfully (Taggart, Alexander, and
Arnold, p. 51). This may be due to the tremendous expenses incurred during the IPO and throughout its
existence as a public company.

A public offering cost on average $617,000

(McCune,

p. 28).

22 percent of all capital raised goes to cover the costs of being a public company (Taggart,
Arnold, p. 52).
Exchange

Commission

stockholders,

.
I-

I
III

An estimated $100,000

in overhead

(SEe) and other government

Approximately

Alexander,

and

is incurred annually to file reports with the Securities and
agencies to cover legal and underwriter

and to hire an auditing firm to review the company's

accounting

fees, to inform

practices (Merrill and Nichols,

p. 135). In compliance with stringent and time-consuming reporting requirements, the company exposes its
financial performance

and other critical data to the public which includes its competitors.

I
I
I

I
I

I
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public.

The public marketplace

in the 1960s was very liberal,

In the 1970s, however,

public financing was almost impossible

Raise Venture Capital,"

p. 196).

allowing any company

to raise money by going

for small companies

(Pratt, "How to

Since the early 80's there has been a strong demand for IPOs of small
\

companies

as shown in Figure

10. The success of firms, such as Hambrecht

and Quist, specializing

in raising

money for emerging high growth companies provide further evidence of this trend.

FIGURE 10

I
I

NUMBER OF VENTURE-BACKED IPOs
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UNDERPRICING THEORIES

Early studies of IPOs focused on the profit potential available in the new issues market. The results of
these studies show that new issues typically have large positive returns during a short period following the
offering.

It is not rare to have initial returns above 17 percent (Ibbotson and Jaffe, p. 1037).

war era, however,

there have been periods in which underpricing

well above the 17 percent mark.

has been significantly

During the post-

larger and initial returns

These periods are referred to as the "hot issue" market (Ibbotson and Jaffe,

p. 1027).

"Hot Issue Markets"

by Ibbotson and Jaffe examines new issues from January

1960 to October

to predict

"hot issue" markets.

Their results imply that the first month returns are predictable

1970

and not random.

In order to receive a higher offer price, issuers should issue stock during a cold issue market.

The "hot issue" market was also analyzed by J. Ritter. Specifically, Ritter examined the 1980 IPO
market to test if high-risk IPOs are underpriced

more than low risk IPOs (p. 215).

During the IS-month period

from January 1980 to March 1981, initial returns averaged over 48 percent (Ritter, p. 215). If high-risk IPOs
are underpriced

more than low-risk offerings,

excessive returns.

The study, however,

were concentrated

in one industry,

underwriters

exploiting

a heavy concentration

of high-risk IPOs would explain the

did not support this hypothesis.

the natural resources.

the natural resources

companies

The high positive returns,

The 1980 hot issue market, therefore,

instead,

resulted from

during the oil and gas boom to produce a rush of

discounted new issues in a concentrated industry (Ritter, p. 239).
A third explanation for underpricing of IPOs was developed in 1982 by Baron. This model states that
when the issuer and investment banker are not equally informed about the capital market, the more informed
banker will discount new issues (Baron, p. 975).

In order to be compensated

for this superior information,

the

underwriter purposely sets lower offer prices; therefore, high initial returns result in the aftermarket.
In 1986, another theory of IPO underpricing was formulated. Rock, in his article "Why New Issues
are Underpriced,"

explains underpricing

as a form of compensation

for the uninformed

investor to stay in the

market (p. 187). The informed investors know the appropriate value of a new issue; therefore, they buy securities at a price less than what they believe is their true market value.

They do not subscribe to overpriced
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issues, issues selling at prices above this expected value. Uninformed investors, however, do not distinguish
between underpriced

and overpriced

initial returns and underpriced

securities.

These investors,

issues with high positive returns.

therefore,

buy overpriced

issues with negative

With no orders from informed

investors for

overpriced issues, the uninformed investor receives 100 percent of the overpriced issues. This is called the
winner's curse. Competing with informed investors for the underpriced issues, however, the uninformed
investor gets only a ration of the discount issues.
indications

of interest for five times the number of underpriced

Uninformed
issues.

Ibbotson and Jaffe note that it is common,to

receive

shares available (Ibbotson and Jaffe, p. 1037).

investors will leave the IPO market if they continue to receive poor returns from the overpriced

The investment

banks, therefore,

purposely

underprice

IPOs to reward the uninformed

bidding on overpriced

securities and provide them an acceptable

issues.

It is beneficial

for the investment

market,

the investment

banker would be unable to distribute the overpriced

In the 1988 article,

"Anatomy

investor for

level of return from the rationed underpriced

banker to do this because without the uninformed

investor in the

issues.

of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock," Tinic proposes that

underpricing is a form of insurance to fend off legal liability and to protect the reputations of investment
bankers (p. 789).

Investment

bankers have little historical

support their offering price of new issues.
subjective.

In light of this uncertainty,

or operating and financial statistics to
the analysis and evaluation

Under the Securities Act of 1933, investors can bring civil suits against investment

issuers for false or inadequate
discount,

information

investment

information

on the registration

statement (Tinic, p. 798).

bankers believe the large initial returns reduce the probability

are

bankers and

By selling IPOs at a

of a lawsuit.

VENTURE CAPITALIST'S lPO STRATEGY

For the venture capitalist,

an initial public offering is the culmination

the equity held by the founder, employees,

.
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capitalist examines the exit possibilities
the greatest number of exit options.
the venture firm's investment

of the "exit" plan.

and investors become liquid (Bartlett, p. 263).

before making an investment,

giving preference

On this day,

The venture

to the investments

with

The choice to exit via an IPO is influenced by the quality of the investee,

strategy,

the portfolio company's

industry, and the IPO market environment

25
(Venture Capital Journal,
reporting
public.

requirements,

"Exiting:

New Patterns in the 1980s," p. 14). The cost of being a public firm, the

and the risk of the public markets permit only the most attractive

investments

to go

During the second quarter of 1992, IPOs with the potential to be viable issues were trading below their

offer prices.

This is not the result of business weaknesses,

but rather a precipitous

rush to take these attractive

investments public (Riordan, p. 42). Venture firms that invest in risky, but attractive investments commonly
use an IPO to liquidate their investments.

Venture firms that look for home runs, invest with the intention of

taking it public.
Venture funds that specialize by industry reveal that the industry may impact the choice of exit vehicle.
Traditionally,

medical and health related businesses,

the IPO market (Venture

Capital Journal,

"Exiting:

as well as biotechnology

companies,

have been leaders in

New Patterns in the 1980s," p. 14). This continued

to hold

true for 1992 in which 25 percent of the IPOs were from medical and health industries and 16 percent from
biotechnology.
performing

Although these industries

had the highest frequency

issues came from two other industries;

in the 1992 IPO market, the best

computer companies

had a stock price increase of 51 percent

and telecommunications/data communication stock prices appreciated 43 percent (Riordan, p. 39).
The exit decisions for a venture capital investment
window means that the public market is not consistently
different periods (Venture

Capital Journal,

window is open, the frequency

"Exiting:

is also influenced

by the IPO environment.

The IPO

receptive to IPOs, but rather favors them during

New Patterns in the 1980s,"p.

14). When the IPO

and ease of going public increases.

UNDERPRICING THEORY OF VENTURE CAPITAL BACKED IPOS

Past research has identified many factors affecting the underpricing
debt in the issuing firm's capital structure,

I
I
I
I

existence of firm-specific
level of ex-ante uncertainty

information

the age of the company,

of IPOs.

the prestigiousness

These include the level of
of the underwriter,

in the equity market, and the size of the firm (Garfinkel,

is also decreased

p. 77).

the

The

by the existence of venture capital support (Barry, Muscarella,

Peavy, and Vetsuypens, p. 1). Venture capitalists specialize their investments to provide intensive monitoring

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

26
services that include holding a concentrated
distribution

or marketing

I

and providing

channels.

Venture capitalists,

since they are investors in the firm going public, provide third party certification

that the offering price reflects all available and relevant inside information (Megginson and Weiss, p. 879). An
unseasoned issue, with limited historical or financial supporting data, is associated with enormous uncertainty in
the capital markets. This is evident in the first day returns of IPOs with 90 percent of the return earned in the
opening transaction (Barry and Jennings, p. 54). Since informational asymmetries exist between the outside
investors and the issuing company,
capital certification
underpricing
maximize

the venture capital certification

not only reduces asymmetrical

information

and total costs of going public (Megginson

the proceeds

from the IPO.

is valuable to reduce uncertainty.

in the offering process,

and Weiss, p. 83).

Venture

but also reduces the

This allows the issuing company to

Venture capitalists also certifY the accuracy of the stock valuation by

retaining a large percent of their equity holdings in the issuing firm after the IPO (Megginson

and Weiss,

p. 883). If the certification was false, the stock value would decline in the aftermarket, causing the venture
capitalists to suffer losses on their stock holdings and fall short in maximizing their return on investment.

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

equity position, serving on the board of directors,

THE CURRENT

There were 151 venture-backed

IPOs in 1992.

STUDY

For comparability,

that were traded during the 21 days following the offering date.
stocks.

I considered

With these constraints,

only published stocks
the study included 147

The daily closing price or average bid and ask price were recorded for each issue for the first 21

trading days. I obtained these prices from Standard and Poor's Dailv Stock Price Record and The Wall Street
Journal.

Figure 11 shows the characteristics

of the sample.

The large standard deviations of the securities

clearly show that the sample includes a diverse set of firms and issues.

Of the 147 stocks, 3 are traded on the

American Stock Exchange, 5 are traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and the remaining 139 stocks are
traded in the Over-the-Counter (OTe) market.
All reported

returns are the daily price for each IPO.

offering price to the first trading day closing price.
calculated

as the average of these two numbers.

The first day IPO returns are calculated

from the

When bid and ask prices were listed, the closing price was

I
I
I
I
I
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FIGURE 11

1992 Venture- Backed IPO Characteristics

Shares Out-

Offer Shares

Offer Size

OOOs

$OOOs

standing OOOs

Offer
Price

II

Mean

8,497

2,458

$29,814

$11.151

.

Standard
Deviation

6,023

1,279

$22,329

$3.708

T Value

17.10

23.30

16.19

36.46

Minimum

850

475

$3,800

$4.75

Maximum

49,477

8,500

$144,500

$20.00

.

.
.
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I
I
I
I
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Prices of over 5,000 of the more than 40 million OTC issues are reported through the National
Association

of Securities

Dealers Automatic

by the NASDAQ

Composite

issues, excluding

warrants,

Quotation System (NASDAQ).

Index that measures over 2,900 NASDAQ

The market returns are measured

National Marketing

System (NMS)

as well as all domestic common stocks traded in the regular NASDAQ market.

In

total, the composite index tracks over 4,300 securities. All reported market returns are the daily percent change
in the NASDAQ Composite Index corresponding to the offering date and the 20 succeeding days of each
individuallPO.
The reported

market-adjusted

percent change in the corresponding
Figure 12 summarizes
Since the venture-backed

returns are equal to the percent price change for the IPO issue minus the
NASDAQ

Composite

Index.

the raw returns and market-adjusted

IPOs experience

large initial returns during the first trading day, the data supports the

empirical and theoretical studies on IPO underpricing.
return on the first day of trading.

returns for the first 20 days of trading.

The remaining

The market rewarded the initial holder over a 12 percent

aftermarket

daily returns averaged less than a one percent

II
II
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positive or negative return.

This is consistent with prior research that realize investors in the after market do

not benefit from the initial underpricing.

Approximately

I

I
I
I

take place

during the first initial trade (Barry and Jennings, p. 54).
The relationship

between market returns and unadjusted

analysis.

The market returns are the independent

variable.

The market returns for the 147 stocks were regressed

line that approximates
calculated

the relationship

stock returns is tested through linear regression

variable and the unadjusted

stock returns are the dependent

with the raw market returns to find the straight

between the two variables.

Estimated

regression

equations were

for the 20 days of returns.
The coefficient

of determination,

assuming a linear relationship

R squared, gives the percentage

of the values that can be explained by

between daily market returns and daily venture-backed

IPO returns.

Thus, larger

R squared values indicated a stronger relationship.

The slope of the regression model is the covariance between the IPO returns and the market returns.
The covariance

measures

the extent to which the market returns and stock returns move together over time.

large positive value slope explains that the variables

II

I

90 percent of all IPO price adjustments

A

move together in a direct positive relationship.

CONCLUSIONS

The R squared and X coefficients, slope, of the regression equations for each of the 20 days is listed in
Figure 13. The returns for day one, which includes the greatest underpricing
the market returns as indicated by its large X coefficient
its higher standard deviation for day one.

The remaining

value.

adjustment,

This high X coefficient

19 regression

equations,

are strongly related to
is also consistent with

representing

the relationship

between the market and the after-market venture-backed IPO activity, suggest random returns for the first
month. This data does not support the findings of Ibbotson and Jaffe who suggest the first month returns are
predictable.
significant

The inconsistent

X coefficients

and varying values of R squared fail to provide statistically

evidence in support of or contrary to the past empirical and theoretical

IPO underpricing

research.
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FIGURE 12

Unadiusted and Market-Adiusted Return Summary

UNADJUSTED RETURNS

Day

Percent
Average
Return

Standard
Deviation

Minimum
Return

Maximum
Return

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

12.15%
0.67%
-0.22%
-0.03 %
-0.33 %
-0.22%
-0.19%
-0.48 %
-0.17%
0.23%
0.15%
-0.83%

19.43%
4.25%
3.56%
3.51 %
3.43%
3.86%
4.01 %
3.85%
4.26%
3.93%
4.22%
3.50%

-17.71 %
-10.26%
-11.36%
-9.09 %
-12.24%
-13.51 %
-14.29%
-14.29%
-12.68%
-11.43%
-23.40%
-12.00%

96.77%
16.92%
16.42 %
13.41 %
9.68%
13.95%
13.79%
11.34%
13.95%
18.52%
16.85%
9.26%

13
14
15
16
17

0.01 %
0.12%
0.00%
-0.22%
0.33%

4.11 %
4.16%
4.60%
4.01 %
4.32%

-13.51 %
-10.53 %
-12.20%
-12.35%
-13.51 %

12.36%
21. 26 %
16.92%
11.63 %
12.96%

18
19
20

-0.02 %
0.15%
0.51 %

4.55%
4.26%
4.02%

-14.89%
-13.89%
-11.76%

21.21 %
20.00%
12.75%

I

,

I

,
MARKET -ADJUSTED RETURNS

,

I
I

I
I

I

I

I

Day

Percent
Average
Return

Standard
Deviation

Minimum
Return

Maximum
Return

1
2
3
4
5

12.09%
0.65%
-0.16%
-0.06%
-0.36 %

19.18%
4.26%
3.55%
3.37%
3.37%

~6

-0.12 %
-0.43 %
-0.25%
0.10%
0.10%
-0.97%
-0.01 %
0.18%
-0.01 %
-0.34%
0.28%
0.16%
0.14%
0.45%

-17.29%
-10.62%
-11.01%
-7.52%
-11.68%
-12.75%
-13.27%
-13.55%
-13.55%
-11. 95 %
-25.12%
-11. 73 %
-11.59%
-10.11 %
-12.49%
-12.79%
-13.14%
-14.64%
-12.72%
-11.41 %

96.53%
17.19%
16.29%
12.21 %
8.94%
12.17%
13.74%
12.36%
13.21 %
17.31 %
15.44 %
8.43%
12.11 %
20.51 %
15.78%
11.70 %
12.54%
21. 78 %
20.40 %
11. 99 %

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

-0.17%

3.67%
4.00%
3.81 %
4.22%
3.77%
4.21 %
3.40%
3.94%
4.12%
4.39%
3.99%
4.12%
4.46%
4.14%
3.96%

I

.

-

I
I
I
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I
I
I
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FIGURE 13
Regression

Output Summary

Day

Standard
Error of
Y Estimate

R
Squared

X
Coefficient

Standard
Error
of Coefficient

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

0.1879
0.0426
0.0355
0.0339
0.0339
0.0365
0.0400
0.0383
0.0424
0.0379
0.0422
0.0343
0.0394
0.0414
0.0436
0.0400
0.0410
0.0450
0.0416
0.0399

0.0776
0.0082
0.0180
0.0799
0.0362
0.1170
0.0151
0.0225
0.0223
0.0866
0.0133
0.0568
0.0930
0.0208
0.1150
0.0169
0.1123
0.0374
0.0620
0.0304

5.4330
0.4218
0.5472
1.1870
0.9027
1.7408
0.5781
0.7983
0.7741
1.2523
0.5730
1.1420
1.6556
0.7472
1.8375
0.5987
1.7841
1.0570
1.2767
0.9151

1.5559
0.3861
0.3361
0.3345
0.3866
0.3973
0.3889
0.4366
0.4252
0.3377
0.4105
0.3863
0.4294
0.4258
0.4234
0.3788
0.4164
0.4451
0.4124
0.4292
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